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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Matthew O. Brooks appeals from the order withholding judgment entered
upon his conditional guilty plea to possession of methamphetamine. On appeal,
Brooks argues the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress.

Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
On March 12, 2012, Idaho State Police Trooper Blake Higley stopped
Brooks' vehicle after he observed Brooks change lanes on Interstate 84 without
first signaling for at least five continuous seconds as required by Idaho Code §
49-808(2).1 (Tr., p.5, Ls.3-7, p.9, L.20 - p.10, L.18, p.13, L.9 - p.14, L.21, p.19,
L.23 - p.20, L.10, p.39, Ls.3-6.) While conversing with Brooks through his open
passenger side window, Trooper Higley smelled the odor of marijuana and also
observed what he recognized as methamphetamine and drug paraphernalia in
plain view on the passenger seat of Brooks' vehicle. (Tr., p.15, L.2 - p.18, L.24,
p.24, Ls.6-12, p.26, L.5 - p.27, L.12.) The trooper retrieved the contraband from
the vehicle and placed Brooks under arrest. (Tr., p.17, Ls.13-18, p.37, L.25p.38, L.18.) The trooper then searched the vehicle and found several additional
items of paraphernalia, including a marijuana pipe, a spoon and two syringes
with injection needles. (R., pp.8, 85.)
The state charged Brooks with possession of methamphetamine.

(R.,

pp.16-17.) Brooks moved to suppress the evidence against him, contending it

1 Trooper Higley testified Brooks "activate[d] his signal [for] approximately less
than two seconds" before making the lane change. (Tr., p.13, Ls.18-20.)
1

was the fruit of an unlawful search and seizure. (R, pp.21-32, 44-58, 74-81.)
Specifically, Brooks argued his act of failing to signal for at least five continuous
seconds before changing lanes on Interstate 84 did not violate I.C. § 49-808(2)
and, therefore, the traffic stop based on his alleged violation of that statute was
unlawful and all evidence obtained as a result thereof should be suppressed.
(R, pp.44-58, 74-81; Tr., p.39, L.20 - p.43, L.18.)

After a hearing and

supplemental briefing, the district court denied the motion.
Brooks filed a motion to reconsider.

(R, pp. 105-1 0.)

(R, pp.84-91.)

The court denied the

motion (R., pp.116-20) and, in doing so, clarified: "[T]his Court reads the plain
language of I.C. § 49-808(2) to require that drivers on controlled-access
highways must use their turn signal continuously for five (5) seconds before
moving right or left" (R, p.117).
Brooks thereafter entered a conditional guilty plea to possession of
methamphetamine, specifically reserving the right to appeal the court's order
denying his motion to suppress. (R, pp.137-48.) The district court accepted
Brooks' plea, withheld judgment, and placed Brooks on probation. (R, pp.15254, 160-63.) Brooks timely appealed from the order withholding judgment. (R,
pp.164-67.)
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ISSUE
Brooks states the issue on appeal as:
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Brooks' motion to
suppress, because the traffic stop was in violation of Mr. Brooks'
constitutional right to be free from unreasonable searches and
seizures?
(Appellant's brief, p.8.)
The state rephrases the issues as:
Has Brooks failed to show error in the denial of his motion to suppress?
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ARGUMENT
Brooks Has Failed To Show Error In The Denial Of His Motion To Suppress
A.

Introduction
Brooks challenges the denial of his motion to suppress, arguing as he did

below that the traffic stop "was not justified at its inception." (Appellant's brief,
p.9.)

Specifically, he contends that his failure to signal for at least five

continuous seconds before making a lane change on Interstate 84 did not violate
I.C. § 49-808(2).

(Appellant's brief, pp.11-20.)

Brooks' argument fails.

The

district court correctly interpreted I.C. § 49-808(2) as requiring drivers on
controlled-access highways to signal continuously for at least five seconds
before making a lane change.

Because the officer observed Brooks fail to

continuously signal for at least five seconds before changing lanes on what
2

Brooks concedes is a controlled-access highway, the officer had a reasonable,
articulable basis to conduct the traffic stop.
Brooks also argues that Trooper Higley's belief that Brooks violated I.C. §
49-808(2) "was a mistake of law that rendered the stop per se unreasonable."
(Appellant's brief, pp.9, 20-26.) This argument is also unavailing. Even if this
Court determines Brooks was not required by I.C. § 49-808(2) to continuously
signal for at least five seconds before changing lanes on the Interstate, the Court

A "controlled-access highway" is defined in the motor vehicle code as: "Any
highway or roadway in respect to which owners or occupants of abutting lands
and other persons have no legal right of access to or from the highway except at
such points only or in such manner as may be determined by the public authority
having jurisdiction over the highway." I.C. § 49-1 09(5)(b). Brooks has conceded,
both below and on appeal, that Interstate 84 is a controlled-access highway. (R.,
p.88; Tr., p.39, L.20 - p.40, L.1; see also Appellant's brief, p.21.)
2

4

should hold the officer's mistaken belief that Brooks violated I.C. § 49-808(2)
was objectively reasonable and did not invalidate the stop.

B.

Standard Of Review
In reviewing a decision on a motion to suppress, the appellate court

accepts the trial court's findings of fact that are supported by sUbstantial
evidence, but freely reviews the application of constitutional principles to those
facts. State v. Diaz, 144 Idaho 300,302,160 P.3d 739, 741 (2007).
The interpretation and construction of a statute present questions of law
over which the appellate court exercises free review. State v. Thompson, 140
Idaho 796,798, 102 P.3d 1115, 1117 (2004).

C.

The District Court Correctly Applied The Law To The Facts In Concluding
That Trooper Higley Had Reasonable Suspicion To Stop Brooks Because
He Violated The Signal Requirements Of I.C. § 49-808(2)
"A traffic stop by an officer constitutes a seizure of the vehicle's occupants

and implicates the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against unreasonable
searches and seizures." State v. Young, 144 Idaho 646,648, 167 P.3d 783, 785
(Ct. App. 2006) (citing Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653 (1979)).
Ordinarily, a warrantless seizure must be based on probable cause to be
reasonable.

Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 499-500 (1983); State v. Bishop,

146 Idaho 804,811,203 P.3d 1203,1210 (2009). However, limited investigatory
detentions, based on less than probable cause, are permissible when justified by
an officer's reasonable, articulable suspicion that a person has committed, or is
about to commit, a crime. Royer, 460 U.S.at 498; Bishop, 146 Idaho at 811, 203
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P.3d at 1210. "An officer may also stop a vehicle to investigate possible criminal
behavior if there is reasonable articulable suspicion that the vehicle is being
driven contrary to traffic laws." Young, 144 Idaho at 648, 167 P.3d at 785 (citing
United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411 (1981)). "Reasonable suspicion requires
less than probable cause but more than speculation or instinct on the part of the
officer." State v. Horton, 150 Idaho 300, 302, 246 P.3d 673, 675 (Ct. App. 2010)
(citation omitted).

Whether an officer possessed reasonable suspicion is

evaluated based on the totality of the circumstances known to the officer at or
before the time of the stop. Bishop, 146 Idaho at 811,203 P.3d at 1210; State v.
Sheldon, 139 Idaho 980,983,88 P.3d 1220, 1223 (Ct. App. 2003).
Trooper Higley stopped Brooks after observing him fail to use his turn
signal for at least five continuous seconds before changing lanes on Interstate
84. (Tr., p.13, L.9 - p.15, L.1.) Idaho Code § 49-808 governs the use of turn
signals on Idaho highways and provides, in relevant part:
(1) No person shall turn a vehicle onto a highway or move a
vehicle right or left upon a highway or merge onto or exit from a
highway unless and until the movement can be made with
reasonable safety nor without giving an appropriate signal.
(2) A signal of intention to turn or move right or left when required
shall be given continuously to warn other traffic. On controlledaccess highways and before turning from a parked position, the
signal shall be given continuously for not less than five (5) seconds
and, in all other instances, for not less than the last one hundred
(100) feet traveled by the vehicle before turning.
I.C. § 49-808(1), (2). The district court interpreted subsection (2) of this statute
as requiring "that on controlled-access highways the signal shall be given
continuously for not less than five (5) seconds." (R., p.88; see also R., p.117
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("[T]his Court reads the plain language of I.C. § 49-808(2) to require that drivers
on controlled access highways must use their turn signal continuously for five (5)
seconds before moving right or left.").) Because Brooks stipulated that Interstate
84 is a controlled-access highway (see R., p.88) and did not otherwise dispute
the officer's testimony that he only signaled for approximately two seconds
before changing lanes, the court upheld the stop as being justified by a
reasonable, articulable suspicion that Brooks violated I.C. § 49-808(2) (see
generally R., pp.84-90, 116-19).
On appeal, Brooks does not challenge any of the district court's factual
findings. Instead he argues that the district court failed to correctly apply the law
to the undisputed facts because, according to Brooks, "the plain and
unambiguous language of I.C. § 49-808(2) requires a signal of not less than five
seconds only where a vehicle driver is both on a controlled-access highway and
turning from a parked position." (Appellant's brief, p.12 (emphasis in original).)
Because he was not turning from a parked position on a controlled-access
highway, Brooks contends he "did not violate I.C. § 49-808(2)." (Id.) Application
of the principles of statutory interpretation shows Brooks is incorrect.
The objective of statutory interpretation is to give effect to legislative
intent. State v. Pina, 149 Idaho 140, 144, 233 P.3d 71, 75 (2010); Robison v.
Bateman-Hall, Inc., 139 Idaho 207, 210, 76 P.3d 951, 954 (2003). Because the
best guide to legislative intent is the wording of the statute itself, the
interpretation of a statute must begin with its literal words.

Verska v. Saint

Alphonsus Reg'l Med. Ctr., 151 Idaho 889, 893,265 P.3d 502, 506 (2011); State
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v. Doe, 147 Idaho 326, 328, 208 P.3d 730, 732 (2009). The words of a statute
'''must be given their plain, usual, and ordinary meaning; and the statute must be
construed as a whole. If the statute is not ambiguous, this Court does not
construe it, but simply follows the law as written.'" Verska, 151 Idaho at 893,265
P.3d at 506 (quoting State v. Schwartz, 139 Idaho 360, 362, 79 P.3d 719, 721
(2003)).

"[W]here statutory language is unambiguous, legislative history and

other extrinsic evidence should not be consulted for the purpose of altering the
clearly expressed intent of the legislature."

19.:. (quoting City of Sun Valley v. Sun

Valley Co., 123 Idaho 665, 667, 851 P.2d 961, 963 (1993)).
The language of I.C. § 49-808(2) at issue in this case provides:

"On

controlled-access highways and before turning from a parked position, the signal
shall be given continuously for not less than five (5) seconds and, in all other
instances, for not less than the last one hundred (100) feet traveled by the
vehicle before turning."

Brooks argues that the word "and" between the

prepositional phrases "[o]n controlled-access highways" and "before turning from
a parked position" is conjunctive and indicates the legislature's intent that the
five-second signal requirement apply only to drivers who are both on a
controlled-access highway and turning from a parked position. (Appellant's brief,
pp.11-19.)

Although the word "and" is usually conjunctive and joins together

words or phrases for the purpose of '''expressing the idea that the latter'" of the
words or phrases so connected are '''to be added to or taken along with the
first,'" Ameritellnns, Inc. v. Pocatello-Chubbock Auditorium or Community Center
Oist., 146 Idaho 202, 205, 192 P.3d 1026, 1029 (2008) (quoting Black's Law
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Dictionary 86 (6th ed. 1990)); see also Brink v. State, 117 Idaho 55, 57,785 P.2d
619, 621 (1990), depending on the context in which it is used, the conjunction
"and" can also simply denote that there is more than one of something. See,
~,

State v. Yzaguirre, 144 Idaho 471, 475-77, 163 P.3d 1183, 1187-1189

(2007) (interpreting word "and" in statutory phrase "[t]o consider and advise its
legal representatives in pending litigation" as signifying two purposes "considering, and advising legal representatives in, pending litigation" - for which
executive session is authorized); K Mart Corp. v. Idaho State Tax Comm'n, 111
Idaho 719, 721, 727 P.2d 1147, 1149 (1986) (interpreting word "and" in statute
providing for certain tax exemptions as indicating there are "two types" of
property subject to the exemption).

Ultimately, the meaning of the word "and,"

like the meaning of every other word in a statute, must be interpreted in light of
the words that surround it.

See,~,

Yzaguirre, 144 Idaho at 476, 163 P.3d at

1188 (first step in determining meaning of disputed word or words "is to examine
the literal words of the statute to determine whether they support the parties'
differing interpretations"). Contrary to Brooks' assertions, interpreting the word
"and" in Section 49-8089(2) in its ordinarily understood conjunctive sense, and in
the context of the entire statute, supports the district court's conclusion that the
five-second signal requirement applies when a driver is moving right or left on a
controlled-access highway and when he or she is turning from a parked position,
not that both circumstances need be present before the five-second signal is
required.
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Construed as a whole, the plain language of I.C. § 49-808(2) clearly sets
forth two sets of circumstances in which a driver is required to signal
continuously for not less than five (5) seconds.

The first is "[o]n controlled-

access highways," and the second is "before turning from a parked position."
That the word "and" separates these two sets of circumstances is not an
indication of legislative intent that both sets of circumstances must exist to trigger
the five-second signal requirement. The legislature used the word "and" twice in
Section 49-808(2) - once to indicate the two circumstances in which a fivesecond signal is required and again, in the same sentence, to indicate a third
circumstance, i.e. "all other instances," in which a signal is required "for not less
than the last one hundred (100) feet traveled by the vehicle before turning."
Given the context in which the word "and" appears throughout the statute, it is
clear that the legislature intended its placement between the phrases "[o]n
controlled-access highways" and "before turning from a parked position" simply
as indicating that there is more than one circumstance, or "instance," in which
the five-second signal requirement applies.
That the legislature intended to enumerate two separate circumstances in
which a five-second signal is required is also supported by a strict grammatical
reading of the statute. Unlike the statutes in the cases upon which Brooks relies,
the statute in this case does not utilize the word "and" merely to join together
items in a conjunctive list. See Ameritel Inns, 146 Idaho at 204-05, 192 P.3d at
1028-29 (interpreting statute defining auditorium district as "one to build, operate,
maintain, market and manage" public facilities as meaning an auditorium district
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must perform all of the listed functions). Nor does it join together two unmodified
verbs.

See Brink, 117 Idaho at 56-57, 785 P.2d at 620-21 (word "and" in

statutory phrase "probable cause to stop and request" is "plainly conjunctive,"
requiring officer to "have probable cause to stop the driver and probable cause to
request that the driver submit to" evidentiary test); State v. Gamino, 148 Idaho
827, 830, 230 P.3d 437, 440 (Ct. App. 2010) (interpreting statute authorizing
court to "[s]uspend the execution of the judgment ... and place the defendant on
probation" as "suggest[ing] that the suspension of a sentence must always be
accompanied by probation").

Rather, the word "and" in I.C. § 49-808(2) joins

together two independent prepositional phrases -

"[o]n controlled-access

highways" and "before turning from a parked position" - each of which
individually modifies the remainder of the sentence to indicate when a fivesecond signal is required.

See http://grammar.yourdictionary.com/parts-of-

speech/prepositions/Prepositional-Phrases.html# ("[T]he preposition functions to
illustrate a logical, temporal, or spatial relationship between the object of the
prepositional phrase and the other components of the sentence. "). If, as Brooks
contends, the legislature intended that both circumstances must exist before the
five-second signal requirement applies, it could have easily indicated as much by
making the prepositional phrases dependent upon each other, as follows:
"Before turning from a parked position on controlled access-highways" - thus
eliminating the need for the word "and" between the prepositional phrases at all.
That the legislature chose not to do so and, instead, used independent
prepositional phrases to describe the circumstances in which a five-second

11

signal is required is evidence of the legislature's intent that either circumstance is
sufficient by itself to trigger the five- second signal requirement.
Brooks argues otherwise.

Specifically, he contends that had "the

legislature wanted to make it clear that a five-second signal was required if the
driver was only on a controlled-access highway, or was only before [sic] turning
from a parked position, then it could have used the word 'or' in the relevant
passage of § 49-808(2)." (Appellant's brief, p.17.) Similarly, he argues that "[b]y
interpreting the statute so as to require a five-second signal when the person
giving the signal is only 'on a controlled-access highway' without also requiring
that the person be 'turning from a parked position' ... [t]he district court
essentially substituted 'or' for 'and,'" thereby impermissibly "transforming the
phrase into one that is disjunctive rather than conjunctive.'"

(Appellant's brief,

p.18.) Brooks' arguments are unavailing for at least two reasons.
First, as already discussed above, it is apparent from the context and
grammatical construction of the statute that the legislature intended by its
placement of the word "and" between "[o]n controlled-access highways" and
"before turning from a parked position" to indicate the two independent
circumstances in which the five-second signal requirement applies.

Brooks'

argument that the word "and" always means "accompanied by" or "taken
together," as opposed to two of something, defies both common sense and the
law.

See,~,

K Mart Corp., 111 Idaho at 721, 727 P.2d at 1149 (word "and"

interpreted as separating "two types" of property subject to statutory exemption).
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Second, even acknowledging that the legislature could have used the
word "or" to indicate that there are two separate circumstances in which the fivesecond signal requirement applies, the fact that it did not do so, and instead
used the word "and," does not mean that either the district court's or the state's
interpretation of the statute is erroneous.

Like courts in numerous other

jurisdictions, the Idaho Supreme Court has recognized that "[t]he word 'and' in a
statute may be read 'or,' and vice versa, whenever the change is necessary to
give the statute sense and effect, or harmonize its different parts, or carry out the
evident intention of the Legislature." State v. Enking, 59 Idaho 321, 82 P.2d 649,
661 (1938); accord In re C.H., 264 P.3d 357, 362 (Cal. 2011); County of Du
Page v. Illinois Labor Relations Bd., 900 N.E.2d 1095, 1103 (III. 2008); Harrell v.
Bowen, 655 S.E.2d 350, 352 (N.C. 2008); Bullseye Distributing LLC v. State, 110
P.3d 1162, 1165 (Wash. App. 2005); 73 Am.Jur.2d Statutes § 147 (updated Feb.
2014); see also Sale v. Johnson, 129 S.E.2d 465, 469-70 (N.C. 1963) ('''The
popular use of 'or' and 'and' is so loose and so frequently inaccurate, that it has
infected statutory enactments.

For this reason, their strict meaning is more

readily departed from than that of other words.'" (Citation omitted)). Contrary to
Brooks' assertions on appeal, interpreting the word "and" in I.C. § 49-808(2) as
signifying two distinct circumstances in which a five-second signal is required is
demanded, not only by the context in which that word is used, but because a
contrary interpretation would render portions of the statute superfluous.
It is a fundamental principle of statutory interpretation that a statute must
be interpreted so that effect is given to its every word and clause.
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State v.

Trusdall, _

Idaho _ , 318 P.3d 955, 960 (Ct. App. 2014); State v. Wright, 154

Idaho 157, 159,295 P.2d 1016, 1018 (Ct. App. 2013). The first sentence of I.C.

§ 49-808(2) states:

"A signal of intention to tum or move right or left when

required shall be given continuously to warn other traffic." (Emphasis added).
The second sentence, at issue in this case, then provides:

"On controlled-

access highways and before turning from a parked position, the signal shall be

given continuously for not less than five (5) seconds and, in all other instances,
for not less than the last one hundred (100) feet traveled by the vehicle before
turning."

I.C. § 49-808(2) (emphasis added).

Based on plain reading of this

language, there can be little doubt that "the signal" referred to in the second
sentence of the statute is the same "signal" already described in the first
sentence - i.e., "[a] signal of intention to turn or move right or left." If, as Brooks
contends, the five-second signal requirement of I.C. § 49-808(2) only applies to
drivers who are both "on controlled-access highways" and "turning from a parked
position," the "or move right or left" language contained in the first sentence of
the statute would be of no effect. Indeed, if Brooks is correct, a person driving
on a controlled-access highway vyould never have to signal an intention to move
right or left for any particular time or distance. Clearly, this could not have been
the legislature's intent. 3
In interpreting I.C. § 49-808(2), this Court must give effect to the entire
statute and assume that the legislature had a purpose in using the language it

The alternative reading is that the statute requires a signal "for not less than the
last one hundred (100) feet traveled" when "turning from a parked position" on a
road other than a controlled-access highway, an obvious impossibility.
3
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did. Trusdall, _Idaho at _

318 P.3d at 959-60; State v. Martinez, 126 Idaho

801,803,891 P.2d 1061, 1063 (Ct. App. 1995). For all of the reasons already
discussed herein, interpreting I.C. § 49-808(2) as a whole leads to the
inescapable conclusion that the five-second signal requirement plainly applies in
two distinct circumstances: when a driver is turning or moving right or left on a
controlled-access highway and when he or she is turning from a parked position.
Brooks' arguments to the contrary are without merit.
Because the plain language of I.C. § 49-808(2) unambiguously evidences
the legislature's intent that the five-second signal requirement applies to drivers
on controlled-access highways regardless of whether they are also turning from
a parked position and, likewise, to drivers turning from a parked position
regardless of whether they are on a controlled-access highway, this Court need
not engage in statutory construction. Even assuming an ambiguity in the statute,
however, the same result obtains from statutory construction. To ascertain the
meaning of an ambiguous statute, "not only must the literal words of the statute
be examined, but also the context of those words, the public policy behind the
statute and its legislative history." Trusdall, _

Idaho at _ , 318 P.3d at 958

(citing State v. Beard, 135 Idaho 641,646,22 P.3d 116, 121 (Ct. App. 2001)).
When construing an ambiguous statute, this Court must give it "an interpretation
which will not render it a nullity."

kL

"Constructions of an ambiguous statute that

would lead to an absurd result are disfavored."

kL

The obvious purpose of I.C. § 49-808(2) is to promote the safety of
motorists travelling on Idaho's highways.
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The signal requirements set forth

therein facilitate that purpose because "signaling puts other potentially affected
drivers on notice of the signaling driver's intention."

Burton v. State of Idaho

Dep't of Transp., 149 Idaho 746, 240 P.3d 933 (Ct. App. 2010) (Gratton, J.,
specially concurring) (citing State v. Dewbre, 133 Idaho 663, 666-67, 991 P.2d
388,391-92 (Ct. App. 1999)). Considering this purpose, and keeping in mind the
context in which the literal words of I.C. § 49-808(2) appear, it only makes sense
that the legislature intended the five-second signal requirement to apply in
circumstances where motorists are most vulnerable, either because they are
driving at high rates of speed (on controlled-access highways) or because they
are sitting stationary (turning from a parked position) on a road upon which other
motorists are traveling. In both circumstances, the requirement of a five-second
signal furthers the purpose of the statute by giving other potentially affected
motorists (1) sufficient notice that the signaling motorist intends to turn or move
left or right on the roadway, and (2) sufficient time to prepare for and react
appropriately to the impending turn or lane change, if such reaction is required.
Although Brooks argu'es otherwise, interpreting the five-second signal
requirement of I.C. § 49-808(2) in the manner he suggests - such that the
requirement applies only to drivers who are turning from a parked position on
controlled-access highways - is entirely inconsistent with the purpose of the
statute and leads to absurd results. First, it is surely the rare circumstance that a
motorist is parked on a controlled-access highway (e.g., an interstate or state
highway) and, presumably even rarer still, that a motorist is turning from a parked
position on a controlled access highway. As aptly pointed out by the state below:
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"[P]eople 'park' to go into the mall, they 'parallel park,' 'park at an angle,' and
park on the side of residential streets and downtown city streets. Drivers do not
'park' on a freeway; they break down, pull over and stop or run out of gas." (R.,
pp.69-70.) Given the infrequency with which motorists actually park and/or turn
form parked positions on controlled-access highways, it strains credulity to
suggest that the legislature intended the five-second signal requirement of I.C. §
49-808(2) to apply only in that very specific and very rare circumstance.
It is equally unlikely that the legislature, in enacting the five-second signal
requirement, intended that motorists driving on controlled-access highways be
allowed to change lanes without signaling an intention to do so for any particular
length of time, even when the failure to do so would create an unsafe driving
situation. Yet, if this Court accepts Brooks' interpretation of I.C. § 49-808(2), that
is precisely the result that follows.
It is beyond dispute that the speed limit on Idaho's Interstate highways
reaches up to 75 m.p.h. The testimony in this case established that, at just 55
m.p.h., a vehicle will travel 80 feet per second. (R., p.85, n.1.) If, as Brooks
contends, a motorist driving on a controlled-access highway need only signal for
100 feet before making a lane change, a motorist driving 55 m.p.h. would only
have to activate his or her signal for a little more than one second before
crossing from one lane of traffic to another. That is hardly enough time to put
other motorists (who are presumably travelling at or near the same speeds) on
notice of the signaling motorist's intention, much less to allow the affected
motorist(s) to react to and/or accommodate the impending lane change. It would
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also mean that motorists driving at lower rates of speed on city streets would
have to provide a significantly longer signal of intention to change lanes than
would motorists traveling at speeds of up to 75 m.p.h. on the freeway. Such
perverse results are not consistent with the underlying purpose of the statute and
surely could not have been intended by the legislature.
On appeal, Brooks acknowledges that this Court may find the language of
I.C. § 49-808(2) ambiguous. (Appellant's brief, p.19.) But rather than attempting
to justify his interpretation of the statute pursuant well-settled principles of
statutory construction, Brooks merely claims that any ambiguity must be resolved
in his favor pursuant to the rule of lenity. (Appellant's brief, pp.19-20.) Brooks'
reliance on the rule of lenity, to the exclusion of other rules of statutory
construction, is wholly misplaced. As recently reiterated by the Idaho Court of
Appeals, the rule of lenity applies to resolve an "interpretive tie" in favor of the
defendant only if, "after examining the text, context, history, and policy of the
statute," the ambiguity remains. Trusdall, _

Idaho at _ , 318 P.3d at 959;

see also State v. Beard, 135 Idaho 641, 646, 22 P.3d 116, 121 (Ct. App. 2001);
State v. Rhode, 133 Idaho 459,462, 988 P.2d 685, 688 (1999). For the reasons
already set forth herein, the text, structure, and purpose of I.C. § 49-808(2)
clearly demonstrate the

legislature's intent that the five-second

signal

requirement applies both to motorists who are driving on controlled-access
highways and to motorists who are turning from a parked position. There being
no remaining ambiguity, the rule of lenity does not apply.
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The district court correctly interpreted I.C. § 49-808(2) as requiring "that
drivers on controlled access highways must use their turn signal continuously for
five (5) seconds before moving right or left." (R, p.88.) Because it is undisputed
that Brooks did not continuously signal for at least five seconds before changing
lanes on Interstate 84, the district court correctly upheld the traffic stop as being
justified by a reasonable, articulable suspicion that Brooks violated I.C. § 49808(2). Brooks has failed to show error in the denial of his motion to suppress.

D.

Even If This Court Determines Brooks Did Not Violate The Signal
Requirements Of I.C. § 49-808(2), This Court Should Conclude The
Officer's Mistaken Belief That He Did Was Objectively Reasonable And
Did Not Invalidate The Stop
Even if this Court accepts Brooks' interpretation of I.C. § 49-808(2) and

holds Brooks was not required to signal for at least five seconds before changing
lanes on Interstate 84, the Court should nevertheless uphold the traffic stop on
the basis that Trooper Higley's mistake regarding the legal requirements of I.C. §
49-808(2) was objectively reasonable. 4
Whether an officer's mistake of law will necessarily invalidate a traffic stop
is an issue that has never been squarely addressed by Idaho's appellate courts. 5

The district court concluded as much in its memorandum decision denying
Brooks' motion to suppress (see R, pp.88-89) but later clarified this conclusion
was "merely dictum" because Trooper Higley correctly interpreted I.C. § 49808(2) as "requir[ing] drivers on controlled-access highways to use their turn
signal for five (5) seconds" (R, p.119).
4

The state recognizes that in Burton v. State of Idaho Dep't of Transp., 149
Idaho 746, 748-50, 240 P.3d 933, 935-37 (Ct. App. 2010), the Idaho Court of
Appeals held that, because the statute upon which the officer effectuated the
traffic stop could not be constitutionally applied to Burton, "no legal cause existed
to effectuate" that stop. It does not appear, however, that Burton Court
5
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See State v. Horton, 150 Idaho 300, 246 P.3d 673 (Ct. App. 2010) (declining to
address whether mistake of law invalidated traffic stop because "mistake at issue
was primarily one of fact"); State v. Buell, 145 Idaho 54, 175 P.3d 216 (Ct. App.
2008) (where officer's alleged mistake of law did not cause Buell's detention,
authorities addressing the viability of detentions based on mistakes of law were
"inapposite"); State v. McCarthy, 133 Idaho 119, 982 P.2d 954 (Ct. App. 1999)
(finding it unnecessary to "resolve whether a police officer's mistake of law is
unreasonable per se" because, even "allowing for reasonable mistakes of law by
police," there was "nothing in the record from which it might be concluded that
the officer's mistake was objectively reasonable"). As noted by the Idaho Court
of Appeals in McCarthy, other courts that have considered the issue "are in
conflict in their assessment of whether a mistake of law is unreasonable per se
or is to be tested under the same reasonableness standard that applies to
mistakes of fact." 133 Idaho at 125, 982 P.2d at 960, cited in Horton, 150 Idaho
at 303, 246 P.3d at 676. It is true, as Brooks contends, that the majority of these
courts hold that a detention based on a mistake of law is always unreasonable.
(See Appellant's brief, pp.21-22 (and cases cited therein).) However, a growing
number of courts hold that, so long as an officer's mistake of law is objectively
reasonable, it can form the reasonable suspicion required to justify a traffic stop.
See, !UL, United States v. Martin, 411 F.3d 998 (8 th Cir. 2005); State v. Heien,
737 S.E.2d 351 (N.C. 2012); State v. Wright, 791 N.W.2d 791 (S.D. 2010);

considered or decided whether an officer's mistake of law can ever be held to be
reasonable such that a stop predicated on the mistake does not run afoul of
either the United States or Idaho constitutions.
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Moore v. State, 986 SO.2d 928, 935 (Miss. 2008); State v. Rheinlander, 649
S.E.2d 828 (Ga. Ct. App. 2007).
While courts on both sides of the issue have articulated persuasive
justifications for their holdings, the reasoning of the Supreme Court of North
Carolina in Heien is particularly compelling.

In that case, an officer stopped

Heien because the vehicle in which he was travelling did not have two properly
functioning brake lights. Heien, 737 S.E.2d at 352. On appeal, the Heien Court
assumed that the relevant statutory provisions required only one properly
functioning brake light.

~

at 354.

Because the traffic stop was predicated

solely on the officer's mistaken belief that the vehicle was being operated in
violation of a statute that, in actuality, did not prohibit the conduct at issue, the
question squarely before the Heien Court was whether the officer's mistake of
law nonetheless gave rise to the reasonable suspicion necessary to conduct the
routine traffic stop.

lsi.

In resolving this question, the Heien Court examined the conflicting views
of the various federal and state courts that have addressed the issue.

~

at 355-

56. The court acknowledged the justification for the majority rule - i.e., that, to
be constitutionally permissible, "a stop must be objectively grounded in the actual
governing law."

lsi.

at 356 (citing United States v. Chanthasouxat, 342 F.3d

th

Cir. 2003) (and cases cited therein». The court ultimately

1271, 1277-78 (11

found the justifications for the minority rule "more compelling," however, citing
the Eighth Circuit's reasoning that allowing for objectively reasonable mistakes of
law "is in keeping with the foundational principle that an officer's actions must be
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'objectively reasonable in the circumstances.'"

~

(citing Martin, 411 F.3d at

1001).
Expounding on the Eighth Circuit's rationale, the Heien Court proffered a
number of convincing reasons why allowing for reasonable mistakes of law does
not offend the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against unreasonable searches
and seizures, all of which would apply equally under a state constitutional
analysis. First, such a rule is entirely "consistent with the primary command of
the Fourth Amendment - that law enforcement agents act reasonably."
(citing Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653-54 (1979)).

~

Indeed, as even

Brooks acknowledges on appeal (Appellant's brief, p.23), "[t]he touchstone of the
Fourth Amendment is reasonableness." United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112,
118 (2001).

A rule that prohibits an officer from making even objectively

reasonable mistakes, "mandating that he be perfect, would impose a greater
burden than that required under the Fourth Amendment." Heien, 737 S.E.2d at
356.
Next, a rule that allows for objectively reasonable mistakes of law by
officers, at least as to the interpretation of traffic laws, is also justified by the
interests at stake during a traffic stop. As explained by the court in Heien:
[B]ecause we are particularly concerned for maintaining safe
roadways, we do not want to discourage our police officers from
conducting stops for perceived traffic violations. A routine traffic
stop, based on what an officer reasonably perceives to be a
violation, is not a substantial interference with the detained
individual and is a minimal invasion of privacy .... And particularly
when judged against society's countervailing interest in keeping its
roads safe, we think it prudent to endorse the reasonable
interpretation of our traffic safety laws.
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lsi at 357. The fact that a traffic stop need only be supported by reasonable
suspicion and involves only a minimal intrusion on the privacy of the individual
stopped is what differentiates this case from other cases in which the Idaho
Supreme Court has declined to apply a "good faith" exception to the exclusionary
rule under the Idaho Constitution. See State v. Koivu, 152 Idaho 511, 272 P.3d
483 (2012); State v. Guzman, 122 Idaho 981, 842 P.2d 660 (1992).

While

providing citizens greater protections from warrantless searches of their person,
homes, cars and other property may well be justified in light of the inherently
invasive nature of such searches, the same concerns are not present when an
officer, having an objectively reasonable (albeit mistaken) belief that a motorist
has committed a traffic violation, briefly detains the motorist for the purpose of
simply confirming or dispelling that suspicion.
Holding that an officer's objectively reasonable mistake of law does not
ipso facto render a traffic stop invalid also makes sense because, unlike

attorneys, officers are not trained in the intricacies of the substantive law and, as
such, cannot be expected "to interpret the traffic laws with the subtlety and
expertise of a criminal defense attorney." Heien, 737 S.E.2d at 356 (quoting
Martin, 411 F.3d at 1001 (internal quotations and citation omitted).) Again, the
Heien Court's reasoning is instructive:
[C]oncerns about the rules of construction regarding the
substantive statutes at issue seem to us to be more applicable to
the subsequent judicial interpretation of a statute and not to a
routine traffic stop that needs to be based only on reasonable
suspicion. A post hoc judicial interpretation of a substantive traffic
law does not determine the reasonableness of a previous traffic
stop within the meaning of the state and federal constitutions.
Such a post hoc determination resolves whether the conduct that
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previously occurred is actually within the contours of the
substantive statute.
But that determination does not resolve
whether the totality of the circumstances present at the time the
conduct transpired supports a reasonable, articulable suspicion
that the statute was being violated. It is the latter inquiry that is the
focus of a constitutionality determination, not the former.

!Q." at 357. Because law enforcement officers are charged with enforcing the law,
not deciding its precise scope, allowing for objectively reasonable mistakes of
law does not offend the Fourth Amendment.
In fact, requiring "law enforcement officers to accurately forecast how a
reviewing court will interpret the substantive law at issue" is actually "inconsistent
with the rationale underlying the reasonable suspicion doctrine."

kL.

Both the

United States Supreme Court and Idaho's appellate courts have recognized that
reasonable suspicion cannot be reduced to any precise legal formula, but must
instead be based on commonsense judgments considering the totality of all of
the circumstances known to the officer.

ti,

Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119,

125 (2000); Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 695 (1996); State v. Kessler,
151 Idaho 653, 655, 262 P.3d 682, 684 (Ct. App. 2011).

Preventing officers

from reasonably interpreting the laws upon which they base traffic stops "would
transform this 'commonsense, nontechnical conception' into something that
requires much more than 'some minimal level of objective justification"'; instead
of "merely requir[ing] that our officers be reasonable," it "would mandate that they
be omniscient." Heien, 737 S.E.2d at 357-58. In addition, treating an officer's
reasonable mistake of law as dispositive of the reasonable suspicion inquiry
would also "insert rigidity into" what is otherwise "a fluid concept" and would
render unrecognizable "the traditional constitutional inquiry" that asks "whether a
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traffic stop is reasonable under all the circumstances."
omitted) (emphasis added).

~

at 358 (citations

Departing from traditional inquiries that guide

whether a traffic stop is constitutionally permissible, based solely on an officer's
inability in the field to accurately predict how a reviewing court will ultimately
interpret the law, seems neither wise no warranted where the officer's mistake of
law is otherwise objectively reasonable.
As a final justification for adopting a rule that allows for reasonable
mistakes of law in the reasonable suspicion context, the Heien Court accurately
observed that such an "approach allows reviewing court to treat all police
mistakes the same."

~

Neither the Supreme Court nor Idaho's appellate courts

"demand factual accuracy from our police when determining whether reasonable
suspicion exists."

~

(citing Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 185-86 (1990));

see also Horton, 150 Idaho at 302-04, 246 P.3d at 675-77; McCarthy, 133 Idaho
at 124-25, 982 P.2d at 959-60.

And, as observed by the Heien Court, there

simply is "no constitutional requirement to distinguish between mistakes of fact
and mistakes of law in this context."

Heien, 737 S.E.2d at 358.

This is

especially true since determining whether a mistake is one of fact or one of law is
not always easy.

~;

accord McCarthy, 133 Idaho at 124-25, 982 P.2d 959-60.

Indeed, in some instances, the two types of mistakes are "inextricably
connected." McCarthy, 133 Idaho at 124, 982 P.2d at 959. Because the line
between mistakes of law and mistakes of fact is not always easily ascertainable,
the better rule, and the one that is consistent with the reasonableness
requirements of both the federal and state constitutions, is that "so long as an
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officer's mistake is [objectively] reasonable, it may give rise to reasonable
suspicion." Heien, 737 S.E.2d at 358.
For all of the reasons set forth above, the state submits that this Court
should hold that, so long as an officer's mistake of law is objectively reasonable,
it can form the reasonable suspicion required to justify a traffic stop. Assuming
this Court adopts such a rule, application of that rule to the facts of this case
easily leads to the conclusion that the traffic stop was constitutionally
permissible.
As discussed in detail in Section C of this brief, the plain and
unambiguous language of I.C. § 49-808(2) requires drivers on controlled-access
highways to signal continuously for at least five seconds before making a lane
change.

Thus, the officer was not mistaken at all in his belief that Brooks

violated the relevant statutory provision when he only signaled for "approximately
less than two seconds" before changing lanes on Interstate 84. (Tr., p.13, Ls.1820.) Even assuming, however, that this Court concludes the five-second signal
requirement did not apply to Brooks' conduct, the officer's mistaken belief that it
did was clearly objectively reasonable. At worst the language of I.C. § 49-808(2)
is ambiguous - i.e., "susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation."
McCarthy, 133 Idaho at 125, 982 P.2d at 960. Because, for the reasons set forth
in Section C, supra, the five-second signal requirement of I.C. § 49-808(2) can,
at the very least be reasonably interpreted to apply to Brooks' conduct, the
officer's mistaken belief that it did was objectively reasonable and did not
invalidate the traffic stop. Compare McCarthy, 133 Idaho at 125, 982 P.2d at
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960 (declining to find alleged mistake of law objectively reasonable where the
operative law was not "ambiguous or susceptible to more than one reasonable
interpretation."). Brooks has therefore failed to show any basis for reversal of the
order denying his motion to suppress.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the withheld judgment
and the district court's order denying Brooks' motion to suppress.
DATED this 9th day of April 2014.
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